Bangladesh should think twice before taking the next step from defence cooperation to formal military alignment with Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Türkiye.
The issue has acquired new urgency following Foreign Affairs Adviser Humaiun Kobir’s interview with BSS. Asked about the possibility of Bangladesh joining a wider framework involving Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Türkiye, Kobir said Dhaka maintains a “positive approach”, while stressing that the decision would be based on Bangladesh’s own interests and changing global economic and trade dynamics. Interestingly, on 21 August Kobir was appointed as the State Minister for Foreign Affairs.
The statement is significant because Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Türkiye signed the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement on 7 August, committing themselves to regard an armed attack on one as an attack on all. Türkiye’s foreign minister has described the arrangement as technically comparable to NATO’s Article 5, although the precise mechanisms for a military response will still require political decisions.
Bangladesh has already taken a step towards deeper military cooperation with these countries. In July, Dhaka joined a Saudi-led Multinational Maritime Defence Alliance aimed at protecting shipping and energy routes around the Red Sea, Bab el-Mandeb and Gulf of Aden; Pakistan and Türkiye are also among its supporters.
The question, therefore, is no longer whether Bangladesh can cooperate militarily with these countries. It already does. The more consequential question is whether Dhaka should cross the next threshold and associate itself with a collective-defence framework involving Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye.
Constitutionally possible—but strategically consequential
The Constitution does not expressly prohibit Bangladesh from joining a military alliance. Article 25 requires the country’s international relations to be guided by respect for national sovereignty and equality, non-interference, peaceful settlement of international disputes, international law and the UN Charter, while advocating the renunciation of force in international relations.
That does not make a defensive alliance unconstitutional. But the character of the obligations matters.
Article 145A requires treaties with foreign countries to be submitted to the President and laid before Parliament; treaties connected with national security are to be laid in a secret session. Article 63 further provides that Bangladesh cannot declare or participate in war without Parliament’s assent.
The constitutional question, therefore, is less “Can Bangladesh join an alliance?” than “What obligations would Bangladesh assume by joining one?”
That distinction is crucial.
Pakistan: reconciliation is not strategic alignment
For Bangladesh, Pakistan cannot be treated as an ordinary defence partner without acknowledging 1971.
Bangladesh was created through a war against the Pakistani state. The Pakistani military crackdown beginning on March 25, 1971, was followed by mass killings, sexual violence, displacement and a nine-month liberation struggle that ended with Pakistan’s surrender on 16 December.
Pakistan recognised Bangladesh only on 22 February 1974.
There is nothing wrong with reconciliation. Normal relations with Islamabad are in Bangladesh’s interest. But normalisation is not the same as strategic alignment.
The pertinent question is simple: what Bangladeshi security requirement necessitates a collective-defence relationship with Pakistan?
If the answer is defence procurement, training, counter-terrorism, maritime security or defence-industry cooperation, those objectives can be pursued without an alliance.
Saudi Arabia: a different history, but history nonetheless
Saudi Arabia’s role in 1971 was fundamentally different from Pakistan’s. Riyadh was not a combatant in the Liberation War. But Saudi Arabia’s political position favoured Pakistan’s territorial integrity, and it did not recognise Bangladesh during the war or the first years after independence. Saudi Arabia formally recognised Bangladesh only on 16 August 1975.
That history should neither be exaggerated nor forgotten.
Today’s Saudi Arabia is an important partner for Bangladesh—economically, diplomatically and through the large Bangladeshi workforce in the Kingdom. Defence and maritime cooperation can also serve Bangladesh’s interests.
But there is a distinction between deepening a strategic partnership with Saudi Arabia and entering its collective military architecture.
Türkiye: valuable partner, historical complication
Türkiye offers Bangladesh genuine defence opportunities. Its rapidly expanding defence industry and capabilities in drones, naval systems and other military technologies make Ankara an attractive partner for Bangladesh’s modernisation.
But Türkiye did not recognise Bangladesh during the Liberation War. It recognised Bangladesh on 22 February 1974, at the OIC summit in Lahore.
That does not make Türkiye an adversary. Bangladesh-Türkiye relations today are friendly and increasingly substantive.
But defence cooperation should not automatically become military alignment—particularly because Türkiye has developed a close defence relationship with Pakistan.
Delhi will see the map, not merely Dhaka’s intentions
India need not regard every Bangladesh-Pakistan defence contact as hostile. Nor does India possess a veto over Bangladesh’s foreign policy.
But geography matters.
Pakistan remains India’s principal military adversary. Türkiye’s close defence relationship with Pakistan and its positions on Kashmir have also generated concern in New Delhi.
A Bangladesh association with the Mecca defence framework could therefore be interpreted in India as the emergence of a strategic grouping on its eastern flank.
This is where the possibility of a perceived “third front” becomes relevant.
Dhaka may insist that its intentions are defensive. India, however, would assess capabilities, geography, military access and intelligence links—not declarations of intent alone.
If Pakistan were to acquire deeper defence access, intelligence cooperation or military infrastructure through Bangladesh, New Delhi would reasonably factor that into its security calculations.
The paradox is that a policy intended to increase Bangladesh’s strategic options could actually reduce them by encouraging India to securitise its eastern frontier.
The contradiction over Indian territory
There is another issue Dhaka should confront. Kabir has complained that allowing Indian territory to be used for activities destabilising Bangladesh, or providing political and media space to fugitives, has angered Bangladesh. He also said that future Bangladesh-India relations and a top-level visit would depend on a change in India’s “mindset” and approach.
The underlying principle is legitimate: no country should permit its territory to become a platform for destabilising a neighbour.
But that principle must work both ways.
If Bangladesh expects India to respect its security sensitivities, Dhaka must understand why India would be concerned about a defence framework involving Pakistan and Türkiye.
Bangladesh cannot demand that India avoid creating strategic vulnerabilities for Dhaka while dismissing India’s concerns when Bangladesh’s own choices potentially create a new strategic pressure point on India’s eastern border.
Trust is a two-way proposition.
History offers a warning
Pakistan’s Cold War experience also illustrates the limits of alliance politics. Islamabad joined SEATO and the Baghdad Pact/CENTO partly to strengthen its position against India. Yet when Pakistan went to war with India, its alliance commitments did not translate into the unconditional military support it had expected. Both organisations eventually disappeared.
The lesson is not that alliances never work. NATO demonstrates the opposite.
The lesson is that alliances work when members have durable, convergent strategic interests and credible willingness to fight for one another.
Bangladesh should therefore ask whether its interests genuinely converge with those of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Türkiye on the conflicts that could trigger a collective military response.
Cooperation without entanglement
Bangladesh has much to gain from all three countries. It should pursue Turkish defence technology, Saudi investment and maritime cooperation, and pragmatic relations with Pakistan. It should strengthen air defence, drones, cyber capabilities, maritime surveillance and domestic defence production.
But none of this requires an automatic collective-defence commitment.
Bangladesh’s strategic strength lies in maintaining multiple partnerships without becoming subordinate to any strategic camp. It should deepen relations with Türkiye without importing Turkish-Pakistani rivalries against India; improve relations with Pakistan without forgetting 1971; strengthen relations with Saudi Arabia without becoming involved in Gulf power politics; and maintain a stable security relationship with India.
That is genuine strategic autonomy.
For a country born from a war fought for sovereignty, the final question should therefore be simple:
Will this framework give Bangladesh greater freedom to make its own decisions—or will it create obligations that allow other countries’ conflicts to determine when Bangladesh goes to war?
Dhaka should have a compelling answer before it takes the next step.
